Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from
  Experimental Economics by Zhou, Nan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
08
06
1v
1 
 [e
co
n.E
M
]  
21
 Fe
b 2
01
8
Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market:
Evidence from Experimental Economics
Nan Zhou1,2, Li Zhang2, Shijian Li2∗, Zhijian Wang1∗
1Experimental Social Science Laboratory,
2College of Computer Science and Technology,
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, 310058, China
Abstract
Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept. Whether algorithmic collusion
is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algo-
rithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing
market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extort its
human rival and gets higher profit in long-run, meanwhile the human rival will
fully collude with the algorithm. As a result, the social welfare declines rapidly
and stably. Both in theory and in experiment, our work confirms that, algorithmic
collusion can be a creditable threat. In application, we hope, the models of the
algorithm design as well as the experiment environment illustrated in this work,
can be an incubator or a test bed for researchers and policymakers to handle the
emerging algorithmic collusion.
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Signature of this work
1. Algorithmic collusion is an emergence concept about antitrust in current AI age.
[1] [2]
2. There is rare laboratory experiment on algorithm-human collusion, although
human-human collusion experiments has 50 years’ history. [3]
3. Cournot duopoly market, which is a basic model for antitrust study, is employed.
4. A simple linear algorithm is developed to enforce human to collude in the market.
(See Equation 4)
5. Algorithmic collusion is, to the best our knowledge, firstly observed in our ex-
periment.
6. As the theoretical expectation, our algorithm can extort its human rival, at the
same time, can facilitate the collusion in significant (See Table 3). Algorithmic
collusion is driven by the human rival unilaterally optimizing his/her own payoff,
so is inevitable.
7. Provide an exemplificative experimental framework to understand algorithmic
collusion, which can be an incubator for antitrust regulation design.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Argument on the creditability of algorithmic collusion threat
Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept in current artificial intelligence age (see
Chapter 4 in [1], and [2] [4]) which was firstly raised by Ezrachi and Stucke in 2015 [5].
Today markets are substantially determined by algorithmic traders. Algorithm-driven
market agents, however, poses a new and formidable challenge to existing antitrust
laws [1]. If the practice hasn’t yet become fully visible for policymakers and regu-
lators, the Topkins, Tord and Eturas cases suggests that it soon might. Scholars and
policymakers have begun to focus on these potential algorithm threat, in which algo-
rithmic collusion is a typical threat [1]. In Topkins-like crimes, the collusion is explicit
collusion, because the seller had otherwise demonstrated a will to collude with other
parties and then coded the algorithm to carry out the agreement. These collusion were
not established automatically by algorithms, so Topkins-like algorithm wasn’t a real
threat.
The real potential threat is the algorithm, which can facilitate collusion tacitly with
its business rivals and they together damage the benefit of the whole market and society.
On the threat, the antitrust communities are now split into two groups. Some of them
argue that it is a actual and a credible threat [1, 6, 7, 8]. Yet, others argue that the
possibility is only theoretical conjecture or something like scientific fictions [9, 10, 11,
12], or it is non-credible threat. In economics science, the argument can be simplified
as a scientific question: When involving market competitions, whether algorithmic
agents can really facilitate tacit collusion?
1.2 No experimental evidences to settle the argument
Facing such questions we turn to seek scientific evidences from laboratory economic
experiments. Theoretically, there are many strategies that can be used to facilitate
collusion [2]. For more than 50 years, economists have been doing experiments on the
tacit collusion in human-human laboratory markets [3][16] [17][18]. But in algorithm-
human competingmarkets, rare collusion confirmed empirically. In order to investigate
the collusion, experimental economics has served as a test-bed for the market dynamics
analysis, and as a incubator for market policymaking [13][14][15]. So, evidences from
controlled laboratory experiments are expected.
To assessing the collusion, Cournot market model is a benchmark [19][20]. Mean-
while, duopoly is the simplest case in oligopoly market. This model has been exten-
sively studied on the economic behavior of industrial organization [21]. As the first
step to study the algorithm-human collusion, we focus on the Cournot duopoly model.
In this model, no algorithm-human collusion has been found till now in experiment.
And, in this paper, we hope to provide an experimental evidence of the tacit collusion.
We hope to see the evolutionary processes of the tacit collusion behaviors, the rising of
the price, and the declines of the social warfare. With these experiment observations,
we hope to illustrate how an algorithmic collusion could be a creditable threat — This
is the aim of this investigation.
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1.3 Key literature background
To this aim, our research question can be specified as — how to design an explicit
algorithm, which can practically enforce a human rival to collude in laboratory experi-
ment. Our research is inspired by two literature, one is experimental [22] and another
is theoretical [23], both of which base on the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy theory in
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) [24]. The ZD strategies are a new class of memory-
one, probabilistic and conditional response strategies that are able to unilaterally set the
expected payoff of its opponent in the IPD irrespective of the opponent’s strategy (co-
ercive strategies). ZD strategist simplify its opponent decision making— from strategy
interaction problem to a optimal problem. According to ZD theory, in an algorithm-
human interaction IPD game, if the algorithm applying ZD strategy, its rational human
rival has to cooperate fully. The ZD theory is not only a theoretical imagine, it has been
supported in long-run laboratory IPD experiments, in which the human rivals were en-
force to cooperate [22]. In basic microeconomics theory, a Cournot duopoly market
game is equivalent to a IPD game by extending the IPD strategy space to continuous
action space. In continuous action space game, the theoretical results [23] has shown
the existence of extortion strategy. So, we can expect to demonstrate an algorithm,
which can extort its human rival to collude in an algorithmic-human experiment.
1.4 Our method and result
We investigate the algorithmic collusion threat by two steps — First, we proposed an
algorithm, which can enforce its human rival to collude; Second, we verified the effi-
ciency of the algorithm in laboratory algorithm-human experiments. In the empirical
data, we see the dynamic (evolutionary) process of the collusion and the constantly
decline of the social welfare. With the data, we confirm that, the algorithmic collusion
is creditable threat. Our contributions are mainly three folds. (1) We approach an ex-
tortion algorithm in duopoly competition, and illustrate how to design such algorithm
explicitly. (2) We analyzed the efficiency of the extortion algorithm in experiments,
and showed the algorithm can cause great welfare loss in duopoly competition. (3)
More import, our experiment methods can be applied by antitrust regulators to investi-
gate such algorithmic collusion. A legal (or ethical) dilemma caused by the algorithmic
collusion is discussed at the last.
2 Model and Experiment Design
2.1 Cournot duopoly model and collusion
Cournot duopoly model is a basic economic model for business competitions [21]. In
this model there are only two agents (firms) to make a same product, and the compe-
tition is on quantity. The competition is to make decisions how many production they
offer at the same time. If both firms collude with the other, they can reduce product
supply to a quantity (denoted asQc) to make their profit biggest. The Nash equilibrium
quantity (denoted as Qn) in this model is a situation in which firms interact with each
other and choose their best strategy given the strategies that the other have chosen. If
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the agents maximum the quantity, the price will be lowest and social welfare will be
maximized, and Walrasian Equilibrium point (denoted as Qw) will reach.
In Cournot duopoly market, in dynamics view, the competition is lasting along
time. The strategy and the outcome is keeping changing along time. In each iteration,
each player i chooses a quantity Xi in a finite interval [L,U ]. Price P is a decreasing
function of the aggregate quantity z = x+ y, and player i’s profit, Si, in that iteration
is
Si = a+ (P (z)− c)Xi (1)
including the constant marginal cost c ≥ 0, as well as an exogenous additive constant
a that captures benefits from other activities net of fixed cost [25]. Collusion, as a
concept in economics and in legal, can be defined with this model [21][25].
In this study case, no loss generality, as an example and the comparability, we apply
the exactly same parameters setting as the previous human-human Cournot duopoly
experiments [25]. The parameters are specified as
a = c = 10; P (z) = 120/(x+ y); [L,U ] = [0.1, 6] (2)
in whichL (U ) is the low (up) bound of the available quantity (strategy) of the competi-
tors. In a duopoly market with these specified parameter, in one round of competition,
if both players choose a quantity of 3 (Qn = 3), their profits Sn are 40, respectively,
which implies the price in market is 20 (Pn = 20). At this condition, neither of the
players can benefit by unilaterally deviating this quantity. This state is the Nash equi-
librium. However, if both players choose a quantity of 0.1 (Qc = 0.1), they will reach
joint profit maximum (JPM) state and get 69 profit respectively. In JPM state, the
price in market is 600 (Pc = 600), much higher than Nash equilibrium price (Pn = 20),
which would harm consumer benefit and social welfare. So, in economists and market
regulators view [1], the JPM state is the state of collusion.
2.2 Linear extortion to collusion algorithm
To study the algorithmic collusion, we need to design algorithm first. Considering
the equivalent of Cournot duopoly model and iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game,
our algorithm design is inspired by IPD. A class of IPD strategy is described by the
outcomes of the previous round, namely memory one strategy. Memory one strategy
states that, in a long rounds time (e.g., day, hour, minute) series T = {1, 2, 3, ..., t−
1, t, t+1, ...}, the strategy at t round depends only on the latest previous round (t− 1).
In a (X, Y) two player game, at t, the player Y can use the information set at time t− 1
to decide its own strategy y at t as
yt = g
(
xt−1, yt−1, S
X
t−1, S
Y
t−1
)
(3)
We suggest an algorithm, namely Linear Extortion to Collusion Algorithm (LECA).We
set the algorithm Y’s normalized payoff (SY − Sn) linearly depending on its human
rival X’s normalized payoff (SX − Sn) as
SY (xt−1, yt)− Sn = k
[
SX(xt−1, yt)− Sn
]
, (4)
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Figure 1: Relationship between the duopoly quantities x and y and extortion parameter k.
x axis means the quantity of the human rival X. y axis means the quantity of the algorithm Y.
Vertical axis k means normalization ratio between the algorithm profit and its human rival profit.
When k is given, the y is determined by x, as shown in Equation (4), with the parameters speci-
fied in Equation (2). Interval of both x and y are between collusive point and Nash equilibrium
point, [0.1, 3]. It is clear that, when the algorithmic agent determines k, for any x, the algorithm
strategy y is determined.
in which k is a constant, yt is the quantity of the algorithm Y at t, xt−1 is the quantity of
the human rival X at t−1, and Sn is the profile at Nash equilibrium. When k > 1, the
expected profile of the algorithm Y is to earn more profile than its rival X, and Y can
be called as extorter. k is called as the extortion parameter, which can be unilaterally
determined by the algorithm agent Y. For a given k, in general, for any given xt−1 (the
quantity of the human rival X at t−1), mathematically, there could exist a solution for
yt (the quantity of the algorithm Y), as shown in Figure 1.
So, if there is a stationary strategy solution (limt→∞ xt = xt−1) for x , then y is
determined. X can unilaterally optimize its own payoff by solving following equation,
SXo = max
[xL, xU ]
lim
t→∞
SX(xt, y(xt−1)) (5)
In general format of the supply-demand function shown in Equation (1), Y’s quan-
tity strategy (y) can be numerical solved referring to Equation (4). As a result, the
stationary solution of X’s quantity strategy, xc, can be obtained. The procedure for
the algorithm for stationary solution is illustrated in Supplementary Information J. Till
now, we have the stationary strategy solution.
However, we need to think of the game as being played over a number of time
periods (denoted as N -rounds), making it dynamic. Suppose X taking a N step period
loop sequence, e.g.,
..., xm, xm+1, xm+2, ..., xm+N−1, xm, ...
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the related strategy sequence of Y should be
..., ym, ym+1, ym+2, ..., ym+N−1, ym, ...
As the strategy sequence of Y is determined on the X sequence, so the outcome is
defined. For the human rival, the average payoff of the N -step period loop (denoted as
S¯Nx ) can be expressed as
S¯XN =
1
N
N∑
t=1
SXt =
1
N
SX(x1, y(xN )) +
1
N
N∑
t=2
SX(xt, y(xt−1)), (6)
in which yt(xt−1) is the Y’s strategy y (at t) in response to X’s strategy x (at t− 1).
We need to constrain the k value to make sure S¯Nx smaller than the payoff S
X
when X stop at xc, the stationary solution of X’s quantity strategy. So, mathematical
question turns to evaluate whether the maximum of S¯XN inX
N space is larger than the
stationary solution SXo . This requires that, for anyN , the solution for the equation,
S¯XN ≥ S
X
c (7)
is an empty set. That is to require, in the space (xi|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} andxi ∈ [L,U ]),
there is no vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xN ) to fulfill the Equation (7), except x1 = x2 =
... = xN = x
o. Once this requirement is fulfilled, with general hypothesis of ratio-
nality, the collusion is inevitable. In another words, this is the sufficient condition for
algorithmic collusion. In current condition, we do not know the general solution for
arbitraryN . In this study, we consider only the first two order, that isN = 2 condition.
The procedure is illustrated in Supplementary Information K.
2.3 An application example
In this study case, by solving Equation (4) with the specification of Equation (2), Y’s
strategy at t (yt) response to the X’s strategy at t−1 (xt−1) is determined, as
yt =
1
2
(k xt−1 + 3 k − xt−1 + 9± Z) (8)
in which Zt−1 =
√
(k + 1)2 x2t−1 + 9(k + 3)
2 + 6 xt−1(k − 5)(k + 1). The optimal
strategy (production quantity) of X, by Equation (8) and Equation (1) with the specifi-
cation of Equation (2), can be expressed as
xc = arg max
x∈ [0.1, 6]
(
x
(
240
3 k + x+ k x− Z + 9
− 10
)
+ 10
)
(9)
in which Z =
√
(k + 1)2 x2 + 6 (k − 5)(k + 1)x+ 9(k + 3)2. It is visible that,
when x ∈ [0.1, 6], the optimized unique solution of the human rival X is xc = 0.1;
meanwhile, the price is
(
240
3 k+xc+k xc−Z+9
− 10
)
, and production quantity of Y is
yc = (3 k − xc + k xc − Z + 9)/2. The explicit formula and figures are shown in
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Supplementary Information A. In k = 1 condition, the solution go back to quantity
pair (x, y) = (0.1000, 0.1000), i.e. the JMP state, in which profile pair (SX , SY ) =
(69.000, 69.000), the traditional collusion.
This algorithm can go further. For example, setting k = 1.2, the solution of pro-
duction pair will be (x, y) = (0.1000, 0.1093), in which profile pair (SX , SY ) =
(66.321, 71.585), an extortion collusion. In our experiment, we set k = 1.296 and the
theoretical extortion collusion pairs are (x, y) = (0.1000, 0.1135) and (SX , SY ) =
(65.203, 72.662). So, referring to Nash equilibrium, the surplus value pair, for human
and algorithm respectively, is (25.203, 32.666). This is unfair but the most profitable
for the human rival. So the collusion will still be established by the algorithm — This
is the theoretical prediction, which will be test in our experiment.
As mentioned above, to consider the dynamics processes is necessary. Referring to
Equation (6), in the first order dynamicsN=2 consideration,
S¯2x = −5 x1 +
120 x1
3 k + 2 x1 − x2 + k x2 − Z2 + 9
+ 5 (10)
−5 x2 +
120 x2
3 k − x1 + 2 x2 + k x1 − Z1 + 9
+ 5
in which Zi =
√
(k + 1)2 x2i + 6 (k − 5)(k + 1)xi + 9(k + 3)
2 and i ∈ {1, 2}. So,
for any given k, if there exists (x1, x2) ∈ [0.1, 6]
2 to satisfy Equation (7), such k is not
valid. Analysis result shows that, the valid extorter parameter k value is
1 < k < 1.296 (11)
The human rival could benefit from deviation, if k > 1.296. As a numerical example,
assume k = 3.0, a strategy which can be used to resist our algorithm, the human rival
may take the jumping strategy {0.1, 0.9, 0.1, 0.9...} (with profile 59.9146) instead of
the strategy {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1...} (with profile 54.3383). So, k = 3.0 is not fit. The
deviation strategy for N = 2 condition can be calculated analytically (explicate results
are shown in Supplementary Information B), and figural results are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: First order dynamics solution An illustration of a potential [x1, x2] jumping to
deviate the [x1, x2] = [0.1, 0.1] condition. When x1 = 0.1, the curve illustrates how x2-
value depends on the extortion parameter k-value, with x2 ∈ [0.1, 6]. If k = 3, S¯2X [0.1, 0.9] >
S¯2X [0.1, 0.1], so the jumping is more profitable, and the stationary x = 0.1 is not the unique
solution. The red line is the up bound of k (1.296). when k larger than the up bound, the solution
of x2 is shown in the blue line.
2.4 Experiment System
For evaluating the performance of LECA, we designed an experiment system. The
whole system consists three phases shown in Figure 3. Phase-1 Self-Training: The
Self-Training is to calculate some parameters in LECA (already calculated in First
order dynamics solution section). Phase-2 Iterated Game: The Iterated Game is
providing a procedure which every human subjects faced with the LECA implemented
by a computer for many iterations in the fixed experiments settings. In each iteration,
LECA and human subjects can select a quantity of products they want to produce, then
the Market Model calculates the human subject’s and LECA’s profits and feedback
to human subject and LECA. At the same time, the server save the information into
database. After checking their strategy and profit, LECA and its human subject will
decide their strategy (quantity) of the next iteration. Phase-3 Test: Test is analyzing the
behavior of human subjects to evaluate the efficiency of algorithm (see Result section).
To make experiment simple, LECA algorithm is stored in referee (server), the quan-
tity LECA produce is calculated by referee. In our experiment, the interval of quantity
is [0.1, 3] for the algorithm and [0.1, 6] for its human rival, and the extortion parameter
is k = 1.296. More details of the technology detail, as well as the difference of the
experimental protocols comparing with [25], are shown in Supplementary Information
C.
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Figure 3: Experiment Framework: This framework consists three phases: Phase1. Self-
Training: Giving algorithm the market model, algorithm calculate some parameter by testing
case. Phase2. Iterated Game: Recruit human subjects to compete with algorithm. The pro-
cesses have already described above. Phase3. Test: The information about iterated game will
been stored in database. With the data, researchers can evaluate the algorithmic collusion.
In an iterated game, a human subject will face the user interface (UI) shown in
Figure 4. There are two panels. The left panel shows the information about the last
ten iterations of the game, including 6 items: the number of the round (iteration) in
the experiment, human subject’s quantity, LECA’s quantity, human subject’s profit,
LECA’s profit and human subject’s total profit, respectively. The right panel is the
decision making panel. In each round, human subject can make decision by submitting
the quantity. When submission done, the server reply information of the 6 items, and a
new round starts again.
Figure 4: Experiment UI An illustration of the asset market task. The left panel indicates the
history information of 10 iterations. After submitting the quantity (right panel), the server will
calculate the quantity and the profits, and the result will shown in the first line. Those result
keep for 10 iterations. The right panel is decision making panel, a slider which can be dragged
represents the quantity that human subject want to produce. After decision was made, human
subject can click the button to submit the decision.
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2.5 Experiment Procedure
The data we used here come from our laboratory experiments which were conducted
at Experimental Social Science Laboratory of Zhejiang University, on 25 December
2017 and 16 to 18 January 2018. A total of 40 undergraduate and graduate students
from various disciplines were recruited to participate in the experiment with each of
them only participating once. In total, we collected 24000 observations of individ-
ual decision making, consisting of choices of human subjects and LECA algorithm
implemented by computer programs. Each experiment lasted for 1 hour. During the
experiment, the player earned scores according to Experiment Environment section and
their choices. After the experiment, the sum of scores were converted to cash according
to an exchange rate and paid to the subjects, the converted function is:
1.2× (TotalProfit/600− 30) + 5 (unit in Yuan RMB)
Here, TotalProfit/600 Yuan RMB is average profit that human subjects earn, 30 Yuan
RMB is baseline, 1.2 is a rate, and 5 Yuan RMB is show-up fee. —- In the 600 rounds
If the two players fall into Nash equilibrium, both of our algorithm and the human rival
gain 24000 points; If the human stays in the smallest value (low bound) of the state
space (x = 0.1) , the human will earn 39660 points total. The average earning is about
40 Yuan RMB.
Before the formal experiment, every human subjects will be allocated a computer.
They were then assigned an instruction manual and a pen, and they played the game
in an small isolated room with a computer. No oral instructions were given, except
that the organizer told the subjects (1) not to refresh the web page to avoid potential
technologic problem (the experiment user interface is a web page), and (2) the type
error in the one page printed Experiment Instruction (The Experiment Introduction for
the student subjects is attached in Supplementary InformationD). They made decisions
by dragging the slider on the screen and clicking submitting button. The software for
the experiment was designed by the authors. No communication was allowed. The
human subjects were told that they would play a game with a fixed computer program
for 600 rounds. The algorithm code is attached in Supplementary Information E.
3 Result
Algorithm-human collusion is observed in our experiment. We see the supplement
constantly decreases, while the human rivals accept the extortion. We see the degree
of collusion constantly increases, while the social warfare constantly decreases. Com-
paring with existing human-human experiment, the algorithm-human collusion can be
more harmful to society. All these observations indicate that, not theoretical conjec-
tures or scientific fictions, the algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat.
3.1 Human rivals collude with the algorithm
Collusion, in a Cournot duopoly market, can be identified by the constantly declining
of the total supplement (quantity). Figure 5, reporting the median of the quantity of the
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40 human rivals of our algorithm, shows clearly that in first 300 iterations of Cournot
game, the human subjects reduce quantity to reach almost fully collusive level (0.1),
then keep their quantity at the collusive level. This result indicates that after about 300
iterations of learning, the human subjects realized they will get biggest profits when
they select a quantity of 0.1 (collusive level). For more details on the evolution of the
individual behaviors, see Supplementary Information M.
To make things more clear, Table 1 shows the average, standard deviation and me-
dian number of quantity and profit 40 human subjects’ performance in iteration 1 - 600,
iteration 1 - 300 and iteration 301 - 600. Table 1 shows that, at the beginning (iteration
1 to iteration 300), the average and median of human subjects’ quantity is much more
larger than the later iterations (iteration 301 to 600). That means, with the increase
of round, human subjects reduce quantity of product to cooperate with LECA. In the
mean time, the profits human subjects earn raise apparently.
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Figure 5: Median quantity of human subjects: The purple line shows the median quantity of
40 samples. Along time, the quantity decline to the blue line (theoretical collusive line). There
are three theoretical lines, represent the quantity that human subjects decide to collude, to keep
at Nash equilibrium and to keep at the Walrasian equilibrium, respectively. Here, the Walrasian
equilibrium means both players fully competing, which both can not get any profit from the
competition.
3.2 Algorithm extorts its human rival and earn higher profile
Now we show LECA should get more profit than its human rival in the algorithm-
human collusion. Table 2 show the statistical comparison results about the profits
of LECA, human subjects and Nash Equilibrium. The statistical analysis methods
are interpreted in Supplementary Information L. Theoretically, we can easily find that
LECA’s profit is more than its rival when rival’s quantity stay unchanged. In this ex-
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Table 1: Quantity and profit of human subject
iteration quantity profit
average stdev median average stdev median
1-600 1.182 1.216 0.664 57.168 9.453 61.768
1-300 1.442 1.265 1.044 55.034 9.575 58.771
301-600 0.923 1.251 0.265 59.302 9.923 64.478
There were 40 samples (student subjects) participated the experiment. Each subject has competed with the algorithm
for 600 iterations. The procedure to reach the results shown in this table as following: At first, calculate each sample’s
average quantity and average profit of 600 iterations, first 300 iterations and last 300 iterations. Then, calculate the
average, standard deviation (stdev) and median of those samples. Take median quantity for example, 0.664 is the
median number of 40 samples’ average quantity in iteration 1 to iteration 600. 1.044 is the median number of 40
samples’ average quantity in iteration 1 to iteration 300. 0.265 is the median number of 40 samples’ average quantity
in iteration 301 to iteration 600.
Table 2: Statistical significant (p-value) of the profiles comparisons∗
Hypothesis Algorithm > Human Algorithm > Nash Human > Nash
Iteration rs tt rs tt rs tt
1-600 0.0177 9.77×10−07 6.97×10−10 1.34×10−12 4.76×10−11 4.39×10−14
1-300 0.142 7.24×10−05 6.97×10−10 1.25×10−10 6.97×10−10 3.11×10−12
301-600 1.71×10−04 5.77×10−08 4.45×10−10 1.18×10−13 5.04×10−12 5.31×10−15
* Algorithm here is our Linear Extortion to Collusion Algorithm (LECA). Human here is the human rivals of LECA in
our experiment. Nash indicates the theoretical profile (40) when both duopoly employ Nash equilibrium at per iteration.
rs represents rank-sum: returns the p-value of a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test. tt represents t-test: returns the
p-value of testing the null hypothesis that the pairwise difference between data vectors has a equal mean. Procedure
to report the p values here is: At first, calculate the profile of Algorithm and Human of all 40 samples, respectively.
Then, calculate statistical results of the profile comparison with the null hypothesis that (1) Algorithm = Human, (2)
Algorithm = Nash and (3) Human= Nash, respectively.
periment, the result is significant even though human subject’s quantity changes. From
Table 2, we can come to a conclusion that the profit they get is
Profit(Algorithm) > Profit(human) > Profit(Nash equilibrium),
because p-value of the ranksum and t-test is very small and closes near to 0. Interest-
ingly, in the table, iteration 1 to 300, the p-value of ranksum and t-test is much more
bigger than iteration 1 to 600 and iteration 300 to 600. In iteration 1 to 300, there
still exist human subjects who want to compete with LECA to gain more profits. How-
ever, after finding that is impossible, more and more human subjects begin to cooperate
with LECA even though they are extorted by LECA. This result confirms that Human
subjects cooperate with LECA.
3.3 Degree of collusion
Degree of collusion is a standard measurement for the anti-competition behavior. This
measurement can be expressed as a percentage of the distance between the Nash and
the Pareto (collusion) outcomes [26]. In our Algorithm-Human duopoly market, the
evolution of the degree of collusion is shown in Figure (6). It is clear that, in our
Algorithm-Human duopoly market, the degree of collusion rises to nearly 100% in
300-400 rounds.
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Figure 6: Degree of Collude: Degree of Collude can be described as
Nq−x
Nq−Cq
, whereNq means
the quantity when both oligopolists reach Nash equilibrium level, x means the quantity that
human subject produce, Cq means the quantity when both oligopolists reach collude level. This
figure is the median degree of collude in each round for all 40 samples. In our experiment, the
theoretical maximum degree of collusion value is (6−0.21)/(6−0.2) = 0.998, which is slightly
lower than 1, because of algorithm extortion motivation, see Equation (4).
3.4 Deadweight loss
Deadweight loss is a loss of economic efficiency that can occur when equilibrium for
a good or a service is not achieved. In our study case, the deadweight loss (or social
welfare lose), at time t, can be formulated as
∫ a
b
(D(x)−S(x)) dx, in which a = xt+yt
(the sum of the quantities of the algorithm yt and of its human rival xt), b = 9 (sum of
the up bound of the quantities of the algorithm (3) and of it human rival (6)), S = 10
(the constant marginal cost c in Equation (2)) and D(x) = 120/x (the price function,
see Equation (2)). In our study case, the theoretical expectation of the deadweight loss
is
∫ 9
0.21(120/x−10) dx= 363.0447 (367.5665278For more details, see Supplementary
Information F). The red line in Figure (7) illustrates the deadweight loss along time.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the duopoly output quantity (in blue) and the deadweight loss (in
red). Median quantity of both oligopolists and deadweight loss in the 600 iterations. Horizon
axis indicates the iteration number; Left vertical axis indicates the sum of the median number of
human and LECA’s total quantity in the iteration; Right vertical axis indicates the deadweight-
loss in the iteration. Median quantity decline in the first 300 iterations from 5 to 0.2; As result,
the deadweight loss increases from 30 to 360 in the first 300 iteration.
From Figure 7, the quantity of both oligarchies drop down quickly, so, in the
Cournot duopoly market, the supplement drop quickly, which leads the increasing of
deadweight loss, and is a threat to social welfare.
3.5 Algorithm-human vs. human-human collusion
Aswe apply the exactly same parameters as the previous human-humanCournot duopoly
experiments [25], it is meaningful to compare our results with theirs. The median quan-
tities, prices, and profits of human subject in human-human competition is shown in
the right panel of Table 3 (data comes from the Table 2, duopoly condition, Page 193
in [25]). As the results from our experiment, the median quantities, prices, and profits
of the algorithm, as well as its human rival, are shown in the left panel of Table 3.
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Table 3: Comparisons by markets, players, quantities, prices, and profits (median)
Algorithm Human Human
iteration Quantity Profit Quantity Profit Price iteration Quantity Profit Price
1-50 2.14 49.79 2.01 47.28 28.57 1-50 4.54 23.74 13.98
1-200 1.22 62.51 1.10 57.54 53.21 1-400 3.17 35.45 18.43
201-400 0.14 67.56 0.12 61.16 436.36 401-800 0.57 63.11 90.01
401-600 ∗0.11 ∗70.30 ∗0.10 ∗64.81 558.14 801-1200 ∗0.28 ∗68.53 107.36
551-600 0.11 70.30 0.10 64.81 558.14 1151-1200 0.40 68.51 91.30
Theoretical Algorithm Human
Expectation∗ 0.1093 72.662 0.10 65.203 573.34 0.1 69 600
∗ In our experiment, the quantities are displayed in two decimal places in the user interface (see Figure 4). And then
the profiles are calculated referring the displayed quantities. So, in the experiment data, the expectations for the algo-
rithm the quantity equals to 0.11 and the profile equals to 71.75; Meanwhile the expectations for the human rival, the
quantity equals to 0.1 and the profile equals to 66.14. The experiment data is provided in the publisher web site, and its
interpretation is provided in Supplementary Information G.
In Table 3, a significant point is that, in the later phase in our experiment (400-
600 rounds), the collusion form. At this condition, the algorithm gain higher pro-
file (70.30) than both of the theoretical collusion profile (69.00) and the experimental
human-human collusion profile (68.53). Meanwhile, its human rival gain less (64.80).
In our algorithm-human experiment, the time to establish collusion (about 400 rounds)
is less than human-human collusion (about 800 rounds) experiment. By the compari-
son, two potential results could be:
1. Algorithm can facilitate the collusion more quickly.
2. There exists incentive for a firm to implicate such algorithm in market.
More details results of the comparisons, especially the individual behaviors of hu-
man subject in the experiments, will be shown in Supplementary Information H.
4 Discussion
The question — the risk that algorithms may work as a facilitating factor for collu-
sion — is deeply concerned [1]. In this paper, we have proposed an algorithm which
automatically extort its rational rival to collude, meanwhile gets higher profile in the
collusion. In laboratory experiments of the algorithm-human Cournot duopoly compe-
titions, the algorithmic collusion is demonstrated. We see the supplement constantly
decreases, the degree of collusion constantly increases, while the social warfare con-
stantly decreases. All these observations indicate that, not theoretical conjectures or
scientific fictions, the algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first empirical observation to confirm that algorithms can work
as a facilitating factor for collusion.
4.1 On algorithm for algorithm-human collusion
How to design an algorithm, which can facilitate collusion by extortion, is demon-
strated explicitly. The proposed algorithm (shown in Equation 4) is design to enforce
its human rival to unilaterally optimizing the payoff, so the algorithmic collusion is a
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result of rationality and is inevitable. In this view, the algorithm design likes the mech-
anism design, by which the collusion is determined by the algorithm. The algorithms,
which can enforce its rational rival to collude, could be abundant, from imitation [25]
to generously persuade (e.g., [24][22]). We have only used memory one strategy, as
shown in Equation 3. Deeper memory strategy is naturally an opinion for further al-
gorithm design. Considering the equivalent of Cournot duopoly model and IPD game,
the algorithms in IPD game competing [27][24][23] can be adapted to study the algo-
rithmic collusion further.
The limitation of our algorithm is obvious. In our study case, the extortion parame-
ter k is limited (see Equation 11) because the human rival could exists dynamic process
to deviate the collision stationary equilibrium to gain more benefit. The theorem of the
autocratic strategies [23] provides only static solution rather than dynamic, but there
could exist switching strategy (dynamic behavior) to against the algorithm. In fact we
have noticed that, when in higher order dynamic process, e,g, in Equation 7 whenN =
3, there exists dynamic solution for human rival to deviate the collusion, even at k=1
condition. For more details, see Supplementary Information I. Equation 7 provides
only the necessary condition, and the sufficient condition is not known.
The competition between oligopoly and governor seems inevitable too — The
oligopoly owner will face how to develop a harder to detect, more effective, more stable
and persistent [6] algorithm for business success. Meanwhile the regulation (governor)
will face how to detect such antitrust algorithm to protect human wellbeing.
4.2 On experiment of algorithm-human collusion
The experimental evidence of algorithm facilitating collusion between human-
algorithm is firstly reported. Collusion in oligopoly game is standard part in the
application of game theory, especially in industry organization theory [21]. Cournot
duopoly market, as the dual of Bertrand duopoly market, is the most basic model for
study collusion. Most related experiments are summarized in the survey [30] and the
recent long-run experiment [25]. The collusion was not observed in short-run ex-
periments (e.g., [17]), but can be observed in long-run [25]. On this point, we set
our experiment times to be long run 600 rounds repeated. Most previous experiment
aimed at human-human interaction, ours is to study algorithm-human collusion. To
our knowledge, the collusion between algorithm-human in Cournot duopoly market is
firstly reported here. [30] [25].
Although we can see the collusion (evolutionary) processes in our experiment, but
the mechanism of the human behaviors is not clear. Further questions include (1)
whether the time spent would be shorter or longer in other experimental protocol. (2)
whether or how the collusion can be established when a market includes more par-
ticipates [29][28], or (3) when the algorithm and human competitors are mixed, or
(4) when the information environment differs, or (5) when the frequency of strategy
changing is limited. It is not surprises that, all old issues need to revisit when algo-
rithms involve [1].
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4.3 On dilemma of algorithm-human collusion
The legitimacy of our algorithmic collusion becomes a challenge to current legal
system. There are two approaches, economics and legal, to consider whether a supra-
competitive price strategies is right or wrong. Economists usually distinguish between
two forms of collusion, explicit and tacit, by the interaction behaviors. Explicit col-
lusion is forbidden. But tacit may be allowed, because, the supra-competitive price
strategies may be the normal outcome of rational economic behaviour of each firm on
the market [1]. In our experiments, different from Topkins-like algorithm cases, there
is not any communication or agreement between the competitors. So the collusion is
not explicit, and is not definitive wrong.
Contrary to the economic approach, which considers collusion a market outcome,
the legal approach focuses on the means used by competitors to achieve such a collu-
sive outcome [1]. The mean of the algorithm approached, shown explicitly in Equation
(4) in this paper, appears normal. Its mean can be explained as the willing to gain k-
times (in our experiments, k=1.296) more profile than its competitor (the human rival).
Meanwhile, as a rational economic behaviour, the human is obliged to collude with the
algorithm for the maximizing its own profile. So, not only its human rival, referring to
current legal consideration, the algorithm is right. As both are right, as their aggregate
behavior, our algorithmic collusion is right?
So, the dilemma is that, the algorithm can enforce the supra-competitive price
strategies and the social human wellbeing is harmed, but current legal seems to say
such algorithm is right. Recent has seen the establishment in the regulations on algo-
rithms, requirements includes transparency and accountability [31], as well as ethics
IEEE P7000x [32]. We wish our work can promote the developments on related fields.
4.4 Implications of our study
Our study has a number of implications:
• (1) To settle down the argument on whether the threat of algorithmic is creditable.
Most notably, we have provided the first evidence in which algorithmic collusion
automatically arises — by extorting its human rival, an algorithm can efficiently
facilitate the tacit collusion.
• (2) To provide an incubator for antitrust legal research. Pioneered by Charles
Plott and his colleagues, in past decades, laboratory experiment has become an
incubator and a test-bed for political economics science, e.g., industrial organiza-
tion [13]. As pointed out by Ezrachi and Stucke [33], the agency would then test
what factors (e.g., information, or number of participation, or frequency of strat-
egy changing, or noise) added to (or removed from) the incubator would make
tacit collusion likelier and more durable. Our work has provided an explicitly
example for algorithm-driven tacit collusion. We hope basing on the algorithm
design (e.g., Equation 4) and the experiment framework (Figure 4), algorithmic
collusion can be investigated more practically.
• (3) For algorithmic engineers in business area, our study has provided an ex-
ample to design collusion strategy for business robot. However, we hope the
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engineers, by Figure 7, can understand the potential harmfulness of algorithmic
collusion on social welfare, as well as the human wellbeing. And then, engineers
would consciously obey the AI industry ethical standards, e.g., IEEE P7000 se-
ries [32].
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